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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 38 of the preliminary list*
POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 31 March 1993 from the Permanent
Representative of Denmark to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text in English and French of a statement on violence in South Africa issued by the European Community and its member States on 30 March 1993 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 38 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Bent HAAKONSEN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Denmark
to the United Nations

* A/48/50.

Annex

Statement on violence in South Africa issued by the European
Community and its member States on 30 March 1993

In spite of the general downward trend of violence since the beginning of 1993 the wave of violence has continued in certain areas of Natal and Transvaal, culminating in a recent series of senseless murders of children and other innocent victims.

The Community and its member States express their abhorrence and condemnation of these crimes and appeal to all parties engaged in the effort to reach a negotiated settlement for a future political dispensation in South Africa to do their utmost to bring the violence to an end and to renounce violence in all its forms.

In this connection the Community and its member States have taken due note, inter alia, of the Goldstone Commission's report of 15 March 1993 by the Committee conducting a preliminary investigation into the activities of the Azanian People's Liberation Army (APLA) as well as of the Commission's recommendations addressed to the international community.

The Community and its member States have in many ways demonstrated their support for the peace process in South Africa, in particular through the deployment of the European Community Observer Mission in South Africa (ECOMSA). Together with the missions of the United Nations, the Organization of African Unity and the Commonwealth, ECOMSA has the mandate to observe the situation on the ground in areas most affected by violence and to facilitate dialogue between the relevant parties in order to defuse potential situations of conflict when needed.

The Community and its member States urge all parties to support the international observer missions in fulfilling their tasks and stress the importance of allowing the international observer missions free access to all parts of South Africa, including the so-called homelands.

They renew their call to all parties to sign the national peace accord and to participate in the peace structures. They welcome the forthcoming resumption of multiparty negotiations and urge all parties who have not yet done so to commit themselves to a speedy and peaceful transition to a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa.



General Assembly Security Council

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1 April 1993

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 112 of the preliminary list*
ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 31 March 1993 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the comments of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the resolution on the rape and abuse of women on the territory of the former Yugoslavia adopted during the 37th session of the Commission on the Status of Women (annex I).

The comments on the conduct of the chairperson during the adoption of the above-mentioned resolution are also attached to this document (annex II).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annexes circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 112 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/48/50.

ANNEX I

Comments of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the Resolution on the Rape and Abuse of Women on the Territory of the former Yugoslavia adopted during the Thirty-Seventh Session of the Commission on the Status of Women

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has repeatedly and very resolutely stated its position with regard to the horrible acts of violence committed on the territory of former Yugoslavia.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is of the opinion that the crimes of abuse and rape of women and children should be most strongly condemned and that those responsible for them, whoever they are and wherever they have occurred should be punished. The abuse of women in war zones, whether undertaken within the strategy of "ethnic cleansing" or for other purposes, is an utterly inhuman act and a crime which is not only contrary to international humanitarian law but also to the basic precepts of morale, honesty and dignity.

The Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, Mr. T.Mazowiecki, states in his fourth report (para.86) that it is not possible at present to determine the number of victims of rape in this conflict. The fact is that the victims are Muslim, Serbian and Croatian women. For this reason it is hard to understand why the international public speaks only of the victims on the Muslim side ignoring that similar acts were committed against Serbs and other ethnic groups. This fact has been also ignored in the Resolution adopted by the Commission on the status of Women.

This ushers in the principle of discrimination against the victims of war which undermines the whole system of human rights, particularly the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

There is sufficient evidence on an organized and systematic pattern of rape of Serb women in areas under Croatian and Moslem control (brothels in Slavonski Brod, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Bihac, Zenica, Konjić, Bugojno, etc.) as well in non-combat areas such as Western Herzegovina (Dretelj and Celebici detention camps where women have been subjected to unspeakable torture). A large number of women who have fled to Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provided testimonies on the ordeals and rape they were subjected to at the hands of the Moslem and Croatian authorities and forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in prisons, camps, hotels, schools, restaurants, flats turned into private prisons, sports centers, and other scenes of crime. Many women did not survive mass rape and torture (see official General Assembly and Security Council documents which contain testimonies of the victims of rape: A/47/813-S/24991, A/48/68-S/25146, A/48/75-S/25217, A/48/77-25231).

Neither the UNHCR not the ICRC have information on places of detention or camps for Moslem women.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia understands the latter part of para 2 of the Resolution to mean the ethnic cleansing undertaken by Croatian authorities against Serb population, since it is well known that Croatia carried out ethnic cleansing of 250,000 Serbs from Western Slavonia and from all the bigger cities in Croatia and the Croatian regular forces are directly engaged in combat in the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina against both Serbs and Moslems.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considers that there is an unequal treatment of all victims of rape in the Resolution adopted by the Commission on the Status of Women which makes it unbalanced and introduces political elements at this crucial period for the termination of the war and negotiations on the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

For all above-mentioned reasons, particularly preambular para 3 and operative para 2, this Resolution is unacceptable to the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

ANNEX II

Comments on the conduct of the Chairperson
during the adoption of the Resolution
on the Rape and Abuse of Women on the
Territory of the former Yugoslavia in the Commission of
the Status on Women

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia wishes to put on record of the thirty - seventh session of the Commission on the Status of Women its strongest objection to the manner in which Mrs. Merwat Tallawi of Egypt conducted the meeting during the adoption of the resolution on the rape and abuse of women on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. One would have thought that the elementary principles of fairness demand that when the Commission is about to take a decision which is of direct concern to a State, that State should at least be afforded the opportunity to express its views on the issue. Mrs. Tallawy deliberately denied that right to the delegation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. She misused her position as Chairperson of the Commission in an extremely partial way thus vulgarizing the seriousness and importance of the honor to chair the UN meeting entrusted to her. She added to the impression that right of women and the condemnation of abhorrent practice of rape in the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not the primary interest of the Commission, nor it is its purpose to establish the truth in an objective and impartial manner. It is regrettable that the Commission on the Status of Women allowed to be manipulated for purely political reasons thus joining in the policy of double standards used against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.



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Forty-eighth session
Item 115 (b) of the preliminary list*

HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS: HUMAN RIGHTS QUESTIONS, INCLUDING
ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES FOR IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVE ENJOYMENT
OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS

Letter dated 1 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative
of Denmark to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text in English and French of a statement on Lesotho issued by the European Community and its member States on 31 March 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under item 115 (b) of the preliminary list.

(Signed) Bent HAAKONSEN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
of Denmark
to the United Nations

* A/48/50.

ANNEX

Statement on Lesotho issued on 31 March 1993 by the
European Community and its member States

The Community and its member States welcome the statements of the international electoral observer teams, including observers from EC Member States, that the general elections on 27 March were, despite some administrative shortcomings, free and fair. They congratulate the people of Lesotho for the admirable patience and determination with which they exercised their right to vote, and recognize the role the military Government and all political parties have played in bringing Lesotho peacefully to democratic elections. The elections represent a major step towards the restoration of democratic, accountable government in Lesotho.

The Community and its member States urge all parties to work together to ensure a speedy and peaceful transfer of power, and call on the winning party to govern in a spirit of reconciliation and tolerance towards the people of Lesotho of all political persuasions.



General Assembly

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A/48/126
2 April 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Forty-eighth session
Item 59 of the preliminary list*

COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT
AGREEMENTS

Letter dated 30 March 1993 from the Permanent
Representative of South Africa to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a speech delivered by the State President of South Africa, Mr. F. W. de Klerk, to a joint session of Parliament on 24 March 1993, announcing developments relating to South Africa's nuclear capability and accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (see annex).

I should be grateful if the text of the present letter and its annex could be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under item 59 of the preliminary list.

(Signed) V. R. W. STEWARD
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/48/50.

ANNEX

Speech delivered on 24 March 1993 by the State
President of South Africa to a joint session of
Parliament

NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY

QUOTE

Mr Speaker, when I decided last week to call a joint session, it was my intention to concentrate on the announcement to Parliament of important information with regard to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and related matters. Since then certain developments have compelled me to cover a much wider area. I am, however, still commencing with announcements relating to South Africa's nuclear capability.

THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY AND RELATED MATTERS

Honourable Members will recall that when I delivered my first opening address on 2 February 1990, I emphasised, among other things, the normalisation of South Africa's international relations. An important aspect of this was, and is, the significant contribution that South Africa can and will have to make towards peace, stability and progress in Southern Africa. With this objective in mind the Government has - in addition to many other initiatives in a variety of other spheres - taken far-reaching and drastic decisions with regard to the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction. This includes nuclear as well as chemical and biological weapons.

The Government acceded to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) on 10 July 1991. We became a founder signatory of the United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction on 14 January 1993. It is also participating in the current review of the Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons.

/...

I wish to concentrate today on the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty and would like to convey important information to Parliament, the public and the international community. It is important that the integrity of the Republic of South Africa with regard to its commitments to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty should be placed above any doubt.

When a country accedes to the NPT, it undertakes, as from the date of accession, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. It also undertakes to enter into a Safeguards Agreement, in terms of which a comprehensive inventory of all the nuclear material and nuclear facilities as they exist for the country as a whole at the time that agreement enters into force, be submitted to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Such facilities and material are then subject to international inspection and verification. The IAEA also conducts regular inspections to verify the inventory and to ensure that these materials and facilities are used for peaceful purposes only.

Since its accession to the NPT, South Africa has strictly adhered to the conditions of the NPT and has maintained a policy of transparency and professional co-operation with the IAEA. This positive approach has led to South Africa's resuming its seat at the IAEA General Conference, since September 1991, without opposition, after an absence of 12 years.

The process of verifying the completeness of South Africa's declaration of nuclear materials and facilities has proceeded so successfully that the IAEA was in the position to report to the Board of Governors in September 1992, after a large number of IAEA inspections, that nothing had been found to suggest that South Africa's inventory of nuclear materials and facilities was not complete, nor was there anything to suggest that the list of facilities and materials submitted for controls were incomplete.

However, mainly because of the events in Iraq, which violated the conditions of the NPT by launching a clandestine nuclear weapons programme, certain countries have called the effectiveness of the IAEA verification regime into question. Some countries have also alleged that South Africa still has covert aspirations in this regard and that it has not fully disclosed its stockpile of enriched uranium.

Such allegations are regularly taken up by both the local and the international press, and are beginning to take on the dimensions of a campaign. South Africa's present nuclear programme which is directed towards commercialisation, including the export of high technology products, is in the process placed under suspicion and is harmed. Our country cannot afford this. Accordingly, I wish today to confirm unequivocally that South Africa is adhering strictly to the requirements of the NPT and that it will continue to do so.

I would, however, like to go further. Any doubt about the Government's intentions with regard to nuclear matters, must, for once and all, be removed. For this reason, the Government has decided to provide full information on South Africa's past nuclear programme despite the fact that the NPT does not require this.

At one stage, South Africa did, indeed, develop a limited nuclear deterrent capability.

The decision to develop this limited capability was taken as early as 1974, against the background of a Soviet expansionist threat in Southern Africa, as well as prevailing uncertainty concerning the designs of the Warsaw Pact members.

The build up of the Cuban forces in Angola from 1975 onwards reinforced the perception that a deterrent was necessary - as did South Africa's relative international isolation and the fact that it could not rely on outside assistance, should it be attacked.

Details relating to the limited deterrent capability, and the strategy in this regard, which were at that time developed, are as follows:

- The objective was the provision of 7 nuclear fission devices, which was considered the minimum for testing purposes and for the maintenance thereafter of credible deterrent capability.
- When the decision was taken to terminate the programme, only 6 devices had been completed.
- No advanced nuclear explosives, such as thermo-nuclear explosives, were manufactured.
- The programme was under the direct control of the Head of Government, who decided that it should be managed and implemented by Armscor.
- Knowledge of the existence of the programme was limited to a number of Ministers on a "need-to-know" basis.
- The strategy was that, if the situation in Southern Africa were to deteriorate seriously, a confidential indication of the deterrent capability, would be given to one or more of the major powers, for example the United States, in an attempt to persuade them to intervene.
- It was never the intention to use the devices and from the outset the emphasis was on deterrence.

This was the situation when I became State President in 1989. As a former Minister of the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC), I was also informed about this.

On my assumption of office as State President it was already evident to me, and also to my colleagues who were also informed, that it was in our national interest that a total reverse - also in respect of our nuclear policy - was called for.

During 1989, the global political situation changed dramatically:

- A cease-fire in Angola was agreed.
- On 22 December 1988, a tripartite agreement was signed at the United Nations with Cuba and Angola which provided for the independence of Namibia and the withdrawal of 50 000 Cuban troops from Angola.
- The Cold War had come to an end and developments leading to the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the break-up of the Soviet-bloc had become the order of the day.

- The prospects of moving away from a confrontational relationship with the international community in general and with our neighbours in Africa, in particular, to one of co-operation and development were good.

In these circumstances a nuclear deterrent had become, not only superfluous, but in fact an obstacle to the development of South Africa's international relations.

World opinion had also become increasingly opposed to nuclear weapons, and significant advantages for South Africa could be forthcoming should it accede to the NPT. Although it already had an advanced nuclear technology base and nuclear industry, accession would facilitate the international exchanges of the new technology for its future development. It could also be of benefit to our neighbouring states and in due course to Africa as a whole.

Within this factual framework, and with consideration to all of the other innovative policy objectives which by then had already begun to take on form, it was decided towards the end of 1989, that the pilot enrichment plant at Pelindaba should be closed and decommissioned.

Early in 1990, final effect was given to decisions that:

- all the nuclear devices should be dismantled and destroyed;
- all the nuclear material in Armscor's possession be recast and returned to the AEC where it should be stored according to internationally accepted measures;
- Armscor's facilities should be decontaminated and be used only for non-nuclear commercial purposes;
- after which South Africa should accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thereby submitting all its nuclear materials and facilities to international safeguards.

The implementation of these decisions and instructions proceeded according to plan. The process of dismantling took place under the strict, joint control of the AEC and ARMSCOR. As a further control measure, an eminent professor of nuclear physics, Prof W L Mouton, was appointed as independent auditor to oversee the process. It was his task to satisfy himself that every gram of nuclear material had been accounted for and all the hardware and design information was destroyed. This has been done.

South Africa acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty on 10 July 1991 and signed, according to the requirements of the Treaty, a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA on 16 September 1991 with immediate force and effect.

On 30 October 1991, in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, South Africa submitted a complete inventory of all nuclear materials and facilities under its jurisdiction which contained such materials on 30 September 1991, since which date all such materials and facilities are subject to international safeguards.

South Africa's hands are clean and we are concealing nothing. Permission has now been granted by the Government, with a view to international inspection, for full access to facilities and records of facilities, which in the past were used for the preparation of a nuclear deterrent capability.

I sincerely trust that this unprecedented act, namely the voluntary dismantling of a nuclear deterrent capability, and the voluntary revelation of all relevant information will confirm this Government's effort to assure transparency. I trust also that South Africa's initiative will inspire other countries to take the same steps.

In conclusion, I wish to emphasize that at no time did South Africa acquire nuclear weapons technology or materials from another country, nor has it provided any to any other country, or co-operated with another country in this regard. Our expertise, technology and nuclear materials were fully protected and dealt with strictly according to international standards and agreements. South Africa has never conducted a clandestine nuclear test.

There may be a perception that the decision to abandon the programme means that the investment in the whole enterprise had been wasted. This is not the case.

The enrichment technology developed by the AEC as well as the nuclear materials which were produced, constitute an important asset for South Africa. They will contribute significantly to the ultimate success of the AEC's peaceful commercialisation programme.

The operation of the pilot enrichment plant allowed South Africa to continue operation of the AEC's research reactor, which is also used for the production of radioactive isotopes for medical purposes, during a period when the international community refused to provide nuclear fuel for its operation.

The nuclear material that was used for the devices has been recovered and will be used to enlarge the production of these and other isotopes. SAFARI-I is amongst the very few reactors which can meet this need.

Furthermore, the application of the enrichment technology to the establishment of the semi-commercial enrichment plant provided South Africa with the ability to provide all the nuclear fuel requirements of the Koeberg nuclear power station, and to guarantee this supply at a time when the delivery of nuclear fuel for Koeberg from overseas was denied.

In addition to this, South Africa's accession to the NPT has already led to the lifting of nuclear sanctions by the United States of America. Exchanges of visits with states in Africa have also taken place with a view to agreements on the use of medical isotopes and training programmes. We have become a member of the African Regional Co-operative Agreement (AFRA), an organization within the IAEA which co-ordinates peaceful, nuclear projects and co-operation between African states in the nuclear field.

The prospects for further co-operation will be enhanced by the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in Africa. The Government has already publicly committed itself to this, and believes that it can make a significant contribution to the establishment of peace and security in Southern Africa.

South Africa will soon be taking an active part in the trans-continental discussions on this all-important issue. We will be supported by the fact that South Africa acquired a nuclear capability, and, in recognition of its new relationship with Africa and the broader international community, abandoned it.

Without accession to the NPT none of this would have been possible. I trust that the book on this chapter of the past can now be closed, and that a new one of international co-operation and trust can now be opened.



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5 April 1993

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 79 of the preliminary list*
REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
DECLARATION ON THE STRENGTHENING
OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 4 April 1993 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of Yugoslavia to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit, enclosed herewith, the statement by the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, of 4 April 1993, on the session of the Assembly of the République serbe at Bileca (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 79 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Dragomir DJOKIĆ
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/48/50.

ANNEX

Statement of 4 April 1993 by the Government of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia on the session of the Assembly of
the République serbe at Bileca

At its meeting held on 4 April 1993, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia considered the results of the session of the Assembly of the République serbe at Bileca, reactions on the adopted Declaration and the ever more frequent threats to tighten the existing and to impose new sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The Government considers that the debate and the Declaration adopted at Bileca have confirmed that the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina are determined to continue the peace process and that they are vitally interested in an early solution of contentious issues related to maps and in reaching a comprehensive, just and lasting political settlement of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The Government recalls that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has sought to bring about a peaceful solution of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina ever since its beginning, on the basis of respect for legitimate interests of all three peoples and their consensus on the form of their life together. In that context, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has supported the Vance-Owen Plan as a useful basis for further negotiations aimed at achieving a consensus on the offered maps.

Proceeding from this, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia acted constructively at the Geneva and New York negotiations and, within the limits of its capabilities, influenced the Bosnian Serbs to render maximum cooperation.

According absolute priority to immediate and unconditional cessation of the military conflict, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia brokered successfully the conclusion of the last agreement on cease-fire in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the only such agreement which is still holding despite sporadic violations by the Muslim and Croat sides.

Assessing as the most important that the present cease-fire be maintained at any cost, which is of vital importance for a successful continuation of the peace process, the Government supports the proposal that a meeting of all three warring parties in the civil war be held in Sarajevo and that the meeting be attended, in an observer capacity, by the Chiefs of the General Staffs of the Army of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia. The Government is convinced that the remaining contentious issues related to the proposed maps can be solved and that they should not put in jeopardy the peace process. To this effect, the Government accepts the appeal of the Assembly at Bileca to the international community to help organize bilateral meetings between warring parties and offers its hospitality and good offices for early direct negotiations between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Muslims, that is, between Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats.

The Government calls on the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation, as well as on the other highest representatives of the

Group of Seven, not to bow to pressure aimed at escalating the crisis and to adopt a position at the Summit at Vancouver in favour of the continuation of peace efforts and negotiations. In doing so, the international community may count on the genuine and wholehearted support and cooperation of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Proceeding from the fact that, at the Geneva and New York negotiations, as well as on other occasions, the international community has explicitly recognized the fact that a civil and inter-ethnic war is being fought in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia resolutely condemns the intentions to tighten the existing and impose new sanctions and requests that the existing sanctions, imposed one-sidedly and unfairly against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, be lifted immediately.



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6 April 1993

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Forty-eighth session
Items 14 and 59 of the
preliminary list*

REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS LIMITATION AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS

Letter dated 2 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative
of South Africa to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you the text of a statement delivered by Ambassador J. P. Roux to the meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency on 23 February 1993.

I should be grateful if this letter and its annexure could be circulated as an official document of the General Assembly under items 14 and 59 of the preliminary list.

(Signed) V. R. W. STEWARD
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

* A/48/50.

ANNEX

Statement by the Ambassador of South Africa to the meeting of
the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, held from 22 to 26 February 1993

Thank you for this opportunity, which is my first, to address this meeting.

Speaking on behalf of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and myself, I look forward to continued and fruitful association with the Board of Governors, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and all its associated committees and bodies. I also wish at this stage to join other distinguished speakers before me in their remarks directed at Mr. Jennekens, the departing Deputy Director-General. We wish him all success in his new endeavour.

South Africa, since the establishment of IAEA in 1957, has maintained sound relations with the organization. Since acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and concluding a Safeguards Agreement with IAEA in 1991, South Africa has gone out of its way to assist the verification team in its task and has willingly complied with any request for access and information, even outside the requirements of the Safeguards Agreement.

South Africa is firmly in favour of greater transparency in all nuclear matters and will support, in principle, any initiatives by the Board in this regard.

Consequently South Africa is prepared, in principle, to participate in the Universal Reporting Scheme envisaged in document GOV/2629 that is now before the Board. The practical implications of South Africa's participation, while some nuclear sanctions are still in existence, are being investigated. The South African Atomic Energy Corporation is also in the process of obtaining the views of South African uranium producers on this matter. Full implementation by South Africa of this proposal will also have to be preceded by enabling legislation.

Should the core reporting list, however, become administratively cumbersome, costly or difficult to implement practically in future, it could inhibit South Africa's full participation. I am sure that many other countries have similar concerns. This is a matter that needs further attention.

Mr. Chairman, in the light of South Africa's commitment to greater transparency, and thus also nuclear non-proliferation, as indicated by me with regard to South Africa's envisaged participation in the Universal Reporting System, please allow me to very briefly also make a few general remarks. The lifting of the European Community's nuclear sanctions against South Africa will pave the way for South Africa's participation in the Zangger Committee and Nuclear Suppliers' Group. I look forward to the day when South Africa will not only be a member of those organizations, but will also participate fully in their deliberations.

As regards the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in Africa, South Africa, as a member of the African Regional Cooperative Agreement for Research, Development and Training related to Nuclear Energy (AFRA), recently proposed six so-called

Footnote a projects. These will hopefully be implemented after the annual Congress of the African Regional Agreement in Kenya in April 1993.

South Africa will fully support the deliberations of the Ad Hoc Nuclear Committee of OAU when it meets in April in Harare to draft a convention on the denuclearization of Africa. South Africa unequivocally endorses a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Africa.

In conclusion, this commitment to non-proliferation was echoed by Mr. R. F. Botha, our Foreign Minister, at the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention in Paris on 14 January 1993:

"South Africa has already acceded to the NPT and concluded a Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA. We are also party to the Biological Weapons Convention. In addition, South Africa is prepared to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime and, with the approval of other countries, to become a member. The world therefore knows that South Africa fully accepts its global and regional responsibilities and is committed to non-proliferation and disarmament."
